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being to refute the inference from defendant's testimony that he had lawful possession
of the money.
Such cross-examination would also have been proper to show that the prosecuting
witness had obtained the money from someone in the governmental service to lay the
foundation for the possible defense of entrapment. See Martin v. United States, 278
Fed. 913 (C.C.A. 2d 1922); O'Brienv. United States, 51 F. (2d) 674 (C.C.A. gth 1931).
In the case under consideration, however, the defense did not state any such purposes for the cross-examination, and the questions were not raised.
Life Insurance-Beneficiary as Murderer and Sole Next of Kin-[West Virginia].The beneficiary of a life insurance policy and sole next of kin of the insured murdered
the insured. The administrator of the insured's estate, which was debt free, sued for
the proceeds of the policy but was denied recovery. Wickline v. PhoenixMit. Life Ins.
Co., io6 W.Va. 424, 145 S.E. 743 (1928). The state then sued the insurance company
claiming the proceeds as bona vacantia. Held, there being no equity in favor of the
state, the insurance company need not pay. State v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170
S.E. 909 (W.Va. 1933).
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy who murders the insured loses his rights
under the policy and the insurance money goes to the estate of the insured. InterSouthern Life Ins. Co. v. Butts, 179 Ark. 349, 16 S.W. (2d) 184 (1929); Schmidt v.
Northern Life Assn. I12 Ia. 41, 83 N.W. 8oo (19oo); Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.,
152 N.C. I, 67 S.E. 53 (191o); but see Spicer v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 268 Fed. 50o (1920).
Where the wrongdoing beneficiary is also a next of kin of the insured some courts permit the insured's administrator to recover, apparently even though this may permit
the murderer to take as next of kin. NationalBenefit Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 38 Oh. App.
454, 176 N.E. 490 (1929); EquitableLife Assurance Society v. Weightman, 6i Okla. io6,
16o Pac. 629 (19x6); Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. i918).
Other courts recognize the administrator's right to recover, but treat the murderer as
non-existent for purposes of distribution of the estate, thus preventing the murderer
recovering as next of kin after having denied him as beneficiary. Illinois Bankers' Life
Assn. v. Collins, 341 Ill. 548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923); De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 6o
S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 8 (1932). But, since under the view of certain courts the statutes
of descent and distribution allow no exception, the policy which prevented the murderer from recovering as beneficiary will also prevent the administrator from recovering. McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 Ia. 863, 16o N.W. 289 (z916); JohnstonSt.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W.Va. 70, roo S.E. 865 (1919). This was the position
taken by the West Virginia court when the administrator sued on the policy involved
in the present case. Wickline v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., io6 W.Va. 424, 145 S.E.
7A3 (1928). The court in that case might well have permitted the administrator to
recover and then have held the sole distributee-murderer as a constructive trustee for
the ones properly entitled to take, all the other heirs of the insured except himself, the
state taking as bona vacantia in the absence of other heirs. This solution has been
suggested for an analogous problem, the murder of an ancestor or testator by an heir
or legatee. See Barnettv. CoUey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W. (2d) 757 (1930); Ellerson
v. Westcott, 148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540 (1896); Van Alstyne v. Ti.ffy, I69 N.Y.S. 173,
103 Misc. 445 (1918); Bryant v. -Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. E88 (1927); Ames,
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Lectures on Legal History (93), 31o, 3ii ;3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed.
I918), 1054. But, since the West Virginia court refused to permit the administrator to
recover, it might well have permitted the state to recover by regarding it as the cestui
of a constructive trust with the murderer-beneficiary as constructive trustee. The contract between the insurance company and the insured was a chose in action, a property
right, which the insured intended to vest in his wife. Since the wrongdoer certainly will
not be permitted to receive it, and since the insurance company should not be able to
escape liability on the contract, the state should be able to claim this chose in action as
property without an owner. See 20 Col. L. Rev. 465 (1920).

Mortgages-Right to Possession of Senior Mortgagee as against Receivers Appointed for Junior Mortgagee-[Illinois].-A senior mortgagee filed a petition praying
that a receiver appointed in a prior foreclosure proceeding brought by a junior mortgagee
be ordered to surrender possession of the mortgaged realty and to turn over the rents and
profits to him. Held, affirming the appellate court's decision, 270 Ill. App. 473, that the
petition be granted since the senior mortgagee was the legal title holder and therefore
entitled to possession of the mortgaged premises. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Il. 3o6,
189 N.E. 312 (1934).
If the prior mortgagee is not in possession the application of the subsequent mortgagee for a receiver will generally be allowed assuming the usual requirements are present. Bryan v. Cormick, I Cox 422 (1788); Dalmer v. Dashwood, 2 Cox 378 (1793);
Silver v. Bishop of Norwich, 3 Swans. 112 (18i8); Berney v. Sewell, x Jac. & IV. 647
(1820). But the appointment must be made without prejudice to those who have prior
rights in the property. Post v. Dorr,4 Ed. Ch. (N.Y.) 412 (i844); Washington Life Ins.
Co. v. Jacob Fleischauer et al., io Hun (N.Y.) ii7 (1877); Courtleyeu v. Hathaway, ii
N.J.Eq. 39, 42 (1855); Tanfield v. Irvine, 2 Russ. 149 (1826). See also, 3 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928), 420-3,
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1937-39.

In Illinois it seems settled that on default the senior mortgagee has a legal right to
possession. Taylor v. Adams, 115 Ill. 570 (i886); Rohrer v. Deatherage,336 Ill. 450, 454,
455, 168 N.E. 650 (1929). If the junior mortgagee has already secured the appointment of a receiver, the senior mortgagee may ask leave of the court of equity in which
the receiver for the junior mortgagee was appointed to bring ejectment. Angel v.
Smith, 9 Ves. 335 (18o4); Brooks v. Greathed, i Jac. & W. 176 (i82o); Green v. Winter,
i Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 6o (r814). But if there is an express recognition of the senior
mortgagee's title in the order granting the receiver some courts intimate that such
leave need not be obtained. See Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. (U.S.) 52 (1852);
Walmslcy v. Mundy, 13 Q.B.D. 807 (1884). But see Underhay v. Read, 20 Q.B.D 209
(1887). But a suit in ejectment frequently involves delay and in the meantime the
junior mortgagee is entitled to the rents and profits collected by the receiver (Sosnick v.
Jesieski, rio N.J.Eq. 267, 159 At. 630 (1932); Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N.Y. 217, 119
N.E. 405 (1918); but see Bergin v. Robbins, 1o9 Conn. 329, 335 (1929)) unless the
senior mortgagee was made a party to the proceedings by the junior mortgagee for the
appointment of the receiver, in which case the proceeds are distributed according to
the priority of the claims. Cross v. Will County Nat. Bank, 177 Ill. 33, 52 N.E. 322

